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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the officer handling the advances. Under the present rule the only
safe course for a corporate lender would be to make a complete
investigation before each advance is made. Stealey, supra.
Until legislation changes the present status of the law in West
Virginia as to mortgages for future advances, the mortgagee will
remain subjected to existing risks.
James Truman Cooper
Taxation and Interstate Commerce
P, the State Tax Commissioner, instituted a declaratory judgment
proceeding in order to determine whether taxes paid by D, a
West Virginia corporation, had been unlawfully collected. D had
been acting as a merchandise broker pursuant to a franchise ar-
rangement under which D had been granted the right to represent
exclusively certain food processors located outside West Virginia.
All of D's business activities of soliciting, securing and preparing
merchandise orders took place in West Virginia. After such orders
had been secured, they were sent to the food processors who re-
served the right to accept or reject the orders and, upon acceptance,
filled the orders and arranged for delivery of the merchandise by
common carrier F.O.B. point of shipment to the purchasers in
West Virginia. The billing was sent directly to the purchaser by
the processor, and payment was made directly to the processor.
The circuit court directed P to refund the taxes because the collec-
tion contravened the commerce clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Held,
reversed. The imposition of a state gross earnings tax on the
commissions paid by nonresident sellers to the manufacturer's
representative for its services in soliciting, obtaining and tran-
smitting orders within the state was not a violation of the com-
merce clause. State ex rel. Battle v. B. D. Bailey & Sons, 146
S.E.2d 686 (W. Va. 1966).
The principal case presents two basic constitutional factors
which have been before the courts many times. (1) One basic
principle is that in the federal system the authority of a state is
limited to its own geographical territory, and therefore, it may not
tax persons, things or events not within its own boundaries. New
York Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628 (1894).
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(2) The other constitutional factor is the familiar but confusing one
of "interstate commerce." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. With reference to
interstate commerce, the United States Supreme Court could have
decided either the grant to Congress was exclusive or the power
was concurrent so that the states could regulate and tax in any
manner not forbidden by Congress. Instead, the case by case
approach has been followed. The rules have been laid down, but
it has been difficult to follow them in all cases.
The constitutional grant to Congress of the power to regulate
interstate commerce operates to limit and restrict the taxing power
of the states in so far as such commerce is involved or affected.
The limits of the power of a state to levy taxes which affect inter-
state commerce are not capable of exact definition. Nearly every
tax imposed by a state affects interstate commerce, and whether a
tax affects such commerce to an unconstitutional extent is largely
a question of degree based on the facts of each case.
There are, of course, some general propositions which are easily
stated, but, in many cases, not so easily applied. As a general
proposition, it may be stated that a tax which so seriously affects
interstate commerce as to impede or interfere with it is an uncon-
stitutional regulation of commerce. Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 387 (1868). It is also well established that a tax which
discriminates against interstate commerce is unconstitutional-the
classic discrimination test. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Min-
ing Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940). On the other hand, it has been said
that it is not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those
engaged in interstate commerce from their fair share of state tax
burdens. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250
(1938). Merely being nondiscriminatory is not sufficient to save a
tax from being declared invalid if it directly burdens interstate
commerce. Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917).
The fact that the imposition of a state tax adds to the cost of inter-
state commerce is not alone sufficient to invalidate the tax as an
interference with that commerce. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Coal Mining Co., supra. The multiple burdens test is yet another
well established general proposition, i.e., whether interestate com-
merce is unconstitutionally subjected to repeated exactions of the
same nature from other states. Gwin v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434
(1939).
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The court in the principal case, in view of these general proposi-
tions, was confronted with the following problems: (1) Was the
taxpayer's business in interstate commerce? (2) If the business
activity was in interstate commerce, was the tax imposed precluded
or rendered unlawful by the commerce clause?
The majority of the court decided that the activity was not one of
interstate commerce since it was performed wholly within West
Virginia. In arriving at their decision, they followed the well
accepted rule that every reasonable construction must be given to
attempt to sustain the constitutionality of a statute, and any reason-
able doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the
legislation in question. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 87 W. Va.
396, 105 S.E. 506 (1921).
Though the court in the principal case could find no West Vir-
ginia case as precedent, three recent decisions involving several
aspects of taxation of interstate were discussed. Gambino v. Jackson,
145 S.E.2d 124 (W.Va. 1966); State ex rel. Battle v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 143 S.E.2d 331 (W. Va. 1965); Nuckols v. Athey, 138 S.E.2d
344 (W. Va. 1964). The court said that these cases sustain the
proposition that the shipments in the principal case constituted
shipments in interstate commerce, but the shipments involved only
the buyer and seller and the taxpayer was not directly involved in
such interstate transactions.
The court distinguished the case of Arslain v. Alderson, 126
W. Va. 880, 30 S.E.2d 533 (1944), from Harper v. Alderson, 126
W. Va. 707, 30 S.E. 2d 521 (1944). In the Arslain case the tax-
payer operated a dry cleaning business in West Virginia. As part
of the business, the taxpayer transported the personal property of
Ohio customers to the taxpayer's plant in West Virginia. Services
were performed on the chattels, and they were returned to the Ohio
customers. The court said this activity was not interstate com-
merce regardless of the interstate transportation of the articles of
personal propery on which the services were performed. The
Harper case involved a taxpayer whose principal place of business
was in West Virginia. The taxpayer provided linen service to cus-
tomers in Ohio and West Virginia. The linens were rented and
delivered to the customers; later they were collected by the taxpayer
and laundered in West Virginia. The court said this was interstate
commerce.
[Vol. 68
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The court distinguished the cases on the basis that the perform-
ance of services within the state was not interstate commerce, but
the interstate transportation or shipment of property was interstate
commerce. The court concluded the taxpayer in the principal case
merely engaged in the performance of services wholly within West
Virginia as distinguished from the interstate transportation or ship-
ment of property and therefore had not engaged in interstate
commerce.
judge Haymond in a strong dissent disapproved of the majority
opinion in nearly every respect and relied on among other cases,
Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). "The
negotiations of sales of goods which are in another state, for the
purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation
is made, is interstate commerce."
The divergence of the positions shows that the problem of state
and local taxation of interstate business is a broad one and one
which may not be definitely settled in the near future. The taxing
jurisdictions involved are not only the states but also all of the
subordinate units of government: counties, municipalities, town-
ships, school districts and many others.
The types of business involved are not only the classic examples
of pure interstate commerce-interstate transportation and com-
munication and interstate sales of tangible goods-but also businesses
which, though not engaged directly in interstate commerce, im-
portantly affect interstate commerce.
Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), Congress
began to study the problem and as a result passed legislation at-
tempting to limit the taxing power of the states in regard to inter-
state commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1963). However, the statute may
affect the state's taxing power only to a limited extent. 11 JouRAL.
oF TAxATIoN 279-281 (1959); 46 VA. L. Bn~v. 297, 300-301 (1960).
Thus, even with the concerted efforts of the legislative and judi-
cial branches of the government, it is safe to assume tht there will
continue to be problems in this particular area of the law. In order
to maintain the essential balances in state and federal government
operations and services, it will be necessary for Congress and the
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courts to shape a workable pattern of taxation which will provide
the needed revenue for the states and yet not unduly burden inter-
state commerce.
Raymond Albert Hinerman
Workmen's Compensation-Average Weekly Wages
P had been employed by the National Cash Register Company
as a machine-maintenance man at an average weekly wage of
sixty-eight dollars. Three nights a week he drove a taxicab for D
at an average weekly wage of twenty-eight dollars. After P had
worked five weeks for D, a passenger shot P rendering him totally
and permanently disabled. The issue presented was whether an
employee who holds two separate jobs and who is injured in one
of them may have his workmen's compensation based on his average
weekly wages from both employments, or whether it must relate
only to the wages earned in the job on which the employee was
injured. The commissioners and lower court found it would be
manifestly unfair to the employee to take only the earnings from
the part-time job to establish the average weekly wage. To do so
would establish his average weekly wage at approximately one-third
of his actual earnings at the time. Held, error and remanded. The
North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act stated that average
weekly wages shall mean the earnings of the injured employee in
the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury.
The employer for whom he was working must pay the weekly
compensation benefit. It would be unfair to D to have P's average
weekly wage computed by combining his earnings from two em-
ployments. To do so would require D to pay more in compensation
than he ever paid P in wages. Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 146
S.E. 2d 479 (N.C. 1966).
Whether an employee, who holds two separate jobs and is injured
in one of them, may have his compensation based on his average
weekly wages from both of the jobs is controlled by statutes in the
several states. A few states have very liberal statutes allowing
earnings from all concurrent employments to be combined in form-
ing the wage basis of an injured employee. On the other hand,
many states have conservative statutes which allow only the earn-
ings from the employment in which the employee was injured to be
used as the basis for computing his average weekly wage.
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